Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014 by Gotkowska, Justyna
3 8
J u s t y n a  G o t k o w s k a
N o r w a y  a N d  t h e  B e a r
N o r w e G i a N  d e f e N c e  p o l i c y




Norway aNd the Bear
NoRWEgiAN dEfENcE policY  
– lESSoNS foR thE BAltic SEA REgioN
Justyna gotkowska
© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich



















ośrodek Studiów wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, poland
phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00






I. NoRWAY’S dEfENcE policY ANd thE high NoRth /9
1. Norway’s national interests  /10
2. Legal issues /13
3. Challenges and threats /15
II. NoRWAY’S dEfENcE policY: coopERAtioN  
ANd dEtERRENcE /20
1. Cooperation with Russia /21
2. Strengthening NATO’s collective defence  /25
3. Building up Norway’s own defence capabilities /30
4. Cooperation across Northern Europe /35
III. NoRWAY ANd thE BAltic SEA REgioN /39
Appendix 1. Norwegian Maritime Boundaries /43
Appendix 2. Norway’s participation in international operations /44
Appendix 3. Military Expenditure /46
Appendix 4. Norwegian Armed Forces: Personnel strength  
and categories /47
























•	 Due	to	 the	 importance	of	 the	Norwegian	High	North	for	 the	
Norway’s	economic	development	and	its	geopolitical	standing	
in	 the	world,	Oslo’s	 economic	 and	 foreign	policy	 is	 based	on	
ensuring	the	ability	to	both	maintain	access	to	and	utilise	the	








threats	 facing	 the	Norwegian	High	North,	Norway	has	 been	





























era.	 Norway’s	 and	 NATO’s	military	 presence	 in	 the	 Norwe-
gian	High	North	is	envisaged	as	a	stabilising	factor	prevent-




explicitly	 portrayed	 as	 a	 threat.	 According	 to	 Oslo,	 overag-




































region	 between	NATO	 and	 Russia	 could	 have	 a	 detrimental	









military-technical	 co-operation	 that	may	 benefit	 the	 armed	
forces	and	the	defence	industries	of	both	countries,	but	which	






by	 the	 Conservatives	 and	 the	 Progress	 Party	 (following	 the	
parliamentary	 elections	 in	 autumn	 2013)	will	 introduce	 any	
major	changes	to	the	existing	policy.	However,	if	changes	are	
made,	 the	 new	 government	 is	more	 likely	 to	 increase	mili-
tary	 spending	and	 to	 revise	 the	 reforms	of	 the	Armed	Forc-
es	 in	order	 to	boost	Norway’s	 operational	 capabilities	 in	 the	
High	North.	The	right-wing	coalition	government	could	also	












































i. norway’s defence policy  
and the high north1
Norway	 is	 currently	one	of	 the	world’s	wealthiest	 countries.	 Its	
prosperity	 is	 linked	 predominantly	 to	 the	 extraction	 of	 oil	 and	
natural	 gas	 from	 the	 Norwegian	 continental	 shelf,	 which	 first	
began	 in	 the	 1970s.	 The	 Norwegian	 petroleum	 sector	 gener-
ates	a	third	of	state	budget	revenue	and	accounts	for	more	than	
half	of	 the	country’s	exports.	Equally	 important	 for	 the	Norwe-




the norwegian high north – which consists of those (mainly) 
maritime areas in the arctic located within the norwegian 
borders or falling under norwegian jurisdiction2 – has in 
recent years once again3 become strategically important for 
oslo (see	Appendix	1).	As	the	Arctic	ice	cover	continues	to	shrink,	
and	new	technologies	are	developed,	the	High	North	is	becoming	






































determined	by	 the	 country’s	 ability	 to	maintain	 access	 to	 these	
resources	and	to	continue	to	exploit	them.	any challenges and 
risks that could in the future threaten the economic develop-
ment of norway’s high north are seen as being of paramount 





1. norway’s national interests 
To	understand	the	importance	of	the	High	North	for	Norway,	one	
needs	to	consider	the	region’s	significance	for	the	three	main	sec-
tors	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 economy:	 energy,	 fishing	 and	 maritime	
transport.










4	 Source	 of	 data:	 The	 Norwegian	 Petroleum	 Directorate,	 ‘Facts	 2013	 –	 The	
Norwegian	petroleum	sector’,	March	2013,	pp.	19-29,	http://npd.no/Global/
Engelsk/3-Publications/Facts/Facts2013/FACTS_2013.pdf	
























Russia.	The	northern	part	 of	 the	Barents	Sea	 remains	 closed	 to	
extraction	activities.	Taking	into	account	the	expected	future	de-
cline	in	production	in	both	the	North	Sea	and	the	Norwegian	Sea,	
the Barents sea basin is seen by the norwegian petroleum in-
dustry as the third most important, and in the long term, as 
norway’s most promising energy region.











mostly	 from	 this	 stock.	 In	 2011	 capelin	 and	 cod	were	Norway’s	
6	 In	 the	case	of	 the	 so-called	Barents	Sea	South,	only	one	field	 is	 currently	
























second	 and	 third	most	 harvested	 fish	 species	 respectively.	the 
Barents sea is therefore a vital area for the norwegian fish-
eries sector.















































currently preparing for a gradual rise in the volume of mari-
time traffic along its coast.
2. legal issues






tions	was	the	lack of delimitation of the maritime border be-
tween russia and norway	in	the	south-eastern	Barents	Sea	and	
the	Arctic	Ocean.	The	dispute,	which	dates	back	to	the	1970s,	cen-
tred	on	disagreements	over	the	delineation	of	exclusive	economic	













and	 the	 jurisdiction	over	 the	establishment	and	 the	utilisation	of	artificial	
islands,	 installations	 and	 equipment,	maritime	 scientific	 research	 and	 the	




















In	2006,	Norway	filed a claim to parts of the continental shelf	
which	extend	beyond	200	nautical	miles	out	from	its	coastal	base-
line	in the high north13.	Oslo	submitted	the	relevant	documents	
to	the	Commission	on	the	Limits	of	the	Continental	Shelf,	which	
issued	 its	 recommendations	 in	 2009.	 Although	 the	 2006	 appli-
cation	did	not	 rule	out	additional	 claims	 in	 the	 future,	 it	 seems	
that	 the	 issue	of	Norway’s	access	 to	 the	Arctic	continental	 shelf	









ing	 their	military	 capabilities	 and	 infrastructure	 in	 the	 Arctic	
region.	Nonetheless,	 in	 2008	all	five	 states	 adopted	 the	 Ilulissat	





gal regime of the maritime areas and of the continental shelf 




























Norway	 interprets	 the	Treaty	 literally,	 and	believes	 that	 equal	
right	of	access	to	Svalbard	(mainly,	the	principle	of	non-discrim-
ination	 in	 granting	 access	 to	natural	 resources,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
taxes	with	 the	 exception	of	 administrative	 fees)	 applies	 only	 to	
land	 territory	and	 the	 territorial	 sea,	 in	 line	with	 international	
law	as	understood	in	1920.	Oslo	believes	that	the	maritime	areas	
and	the	continental	shelf	beyond	the	12-mile	territorial	sea	limit	
remain	 subject	 to	Norway’s	 jurisdiction	and	 sovereignty	 rights.	












3. challenges and threats
Due	to	the	importance	of	the	High	North	for	Norway’s	economic	



















































tive’,	 The Arctic Herald,	 2/2012,	 15	 June	 2012,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/
nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/jgs_taler_artikler/2012/nord_arktis.
html?id=685072
17	 The	Norwegian	Coast	Guard,	or	Kystvakten,	 is	part	of	 the	Royal	Norwegian	


























the	 legal	 regime	 around	 Svalbard	 could	 also	 spark	 a	 boycott	 of	
the	bilateral	regulation	of	fisheries	 in	the	High	North18.	Second,	
potential	 problems	 could	 arise	 from	 the	 exploitation	 of	 natural	







Norwegian	 tariffs19.	 As	 a	 result,	Norway	 remains	 apprehensive	
about	Russia's	actions	and	about	 the	prospect	of	being	 forced	 to	
defend	its	sovereign	rights	over	the	continental	shelf	around	Sval-
bard.	One	possible	scenario	might	be	the	following:	What	would	




18	 In	 the	Barents	Sea,	Norway	has	 collaborated	with	Russia	 since	 the	 1970s;	
every	 year	 the	 countries	 set	 fishing	 quotas	 and	 agree	 on	 the	 division	 of	
catches	 of	 individual	 species	 of	 fish.	 It	 is	 therefore	 unlikely	 that	 this	 co-
operation	would	be	discontinued	as	a	result	of	incidents	involving	Russian	
trawlers.	 Throughout	 the	Cold	War	 period,	 despite	 strained	 relations	 be-
tween	East	and	West,	fisheries	regulations	were	effectively	negotiated.
19	 Brit	 Fløistad,	 ‘Controversy	 over	 the	 Legal	 Regime	 outside	 Svalbard’s	 Ter-
ritorial	Waters’,	DNAK	Security	Brief	6-2008,	FOCUS	NORTH	6-2008,	The	



















russia is the most important actor in the potential crisis sce-
narios anticipated by norway in the high north, both in rela-
tion to soft security (due to russia’s relatively poor and com-
monly disregarded health and safety standards) as well as 
in relation to hard security issues.	The	perception	of	Russia	as	












•	 Moscow	 testing	Norway’s	 determination	 to	 defend	 its	 juris-
diction	and	sovereign	rights	in	the	High	North,	especially	in	
the	areas	around	Svalbard;
•	 Russia’s	 attempts	 to	 undermine	 the	 Norwegian	 interpreta-
tion	of	the	jurisdiction	and	sovereign	rights	around	Svalbard,	






























with	 the	West	 in	other	regions;	 if	Moscow	wanted	 to	divert	 the	
attention	of	the	Russian	society	from	internal	problems	caused	by	
political,	 social	 or	 economic	 instability	 in	Russia;	 and	finally,	 if	
Norway	made	changes	to	its	security,	defence	or	economic	policy	
that	could	have	a	significant	negative	impact	on	Russia’s	national	
interests.	nonetheless, norway is not concerned about a pos-
sible cold war-style invasion by russia, but rather about 
limited and focused military attacks, which in combination 
with non-military instruments (such as cyber-attacks, ter-
rorist attacks, disinformation campaigns) could help russia 















ii. norway’s defence policy:  
cooperation and deterrence
in order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and 
threats in the norwegian high north, oslo has been pursuing 







own	 defence	 capabilities;	 and	 to	 develop	 political	 and	 military	
co-operation	across	Northern	Europe.	the primary objective of 
norwegian defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of cri-
ses and conflicts in the high north that could prove too ‘big’ for 





cy of deterrence currently pursued by norway is qualitatively 
different to that adopted in the cold war era. norway’s and 
nato’s military presence in the norwegian high north is en-
visaged as a stabilising factor, preventing any potential crises. 
oslo wants to avoid russian counteractions and does not wish 
to undermine the stability and security of the high north by 
























The	 principles	 underpinning	 the	 current	 defence	 policy	 have	
cross-party	consensus	in	Norway,	and	the	outcomes	of	the	policy	
have	generally	been	positively	received.	Consequently,	the	coali-
tion	government	 formed	by	 the	Conservatives	and	 the	Progress	
Party	 after	 the	parliamentary	 elections	held	 in	 September	 2013	
is	 unlikely	 to	 introduce	major	 changes	 to	 the	 policy.	 A	 shift	 in	
policy	is	also	unlikely	as	last	year	the	Norwegian	Parliament	ap-











dimension	 of	 the	 policy,	 the	 coalition	 government	may	 seek	 to	
strengthen	Norway’s	 ties	with	 the	United	States	 and	 somewhat	
increase	Norway’s	presence	in	NATO’s	operations23.
1. cooperation with russia
given the fact that the key objective of norway’s defence pol-
icy is to avert potential crises or conflicts in the high north, 
oslo’s cooperation with russia in the arctic aims to minimise 













































24	 At	 the	 Norwegian-Russian	 border	 crossing	 in	 Storskog/Borisglebsk.	 See	
Thomas	Nilsen,	‘First	opening	in	the	Schengen-regime	with	Russia’,	Barents­





Barents	Sea	 and	 in	 the	Sea	of	Okhotsk.	On	 the	basis	 of	 this	deal,	Rosneft	
received	 a	 20%	participating	 interest	 in	 a	 licence	 for	 the	 exploration	 and	
development	of	deposits	in	the	Norwegian	part	of	the	Barents	Sea	in	May	
2013.	In	addition,	Russia’s	LUKoil	was	awarded	participating	shares	in	two	































by	 their	 air	 forces)	 to	 improve	 communication	 and	 procedures,	
amongst	other	things,	and	to	practice	maritime	search	and	rescue	
operations27.
from norway’s point of view, co-operation with other actors 




bility	 and	 security	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 High	 North	 is	 intimately	
26	 In	October	2011,	General	Harald	Sunde	became	the	first	Chief	of	Defence	of	




























The	aim	of	 the	collaboration	 in	 the	Arctic	 is	 therefore	 to	estab-














importantly, russia is not explicitly portrayed as a threat 








collapse	of	 the	Russian	Armed	Forces	 in	 the	 1990s.	At	 the	 same	
time,	Norway	 is	 aware	of	 the	 consequences	 for	 its	 own	defence	
policy	of	the	changing	situation	in	the	High	North.	However	it	be-
lieves	that	overly aggressive rhetoric could threaten coopera-
tion between the two countries. nonetheless, the lack of such 



















rhetoric has not stopped norway from adopting coherent and 
consistent deterrent measures.
2. strengthening nato’s collective defence 
Since	 2008,	Norway	 has	 taken	 steps	 to	 strengthen	NATO’s	 sta-
tus	as	a	collective	defence	alliance,	and	it	has	been	committed	to	
increasing	 NATO’s	 presence	 in	 the	 Norwegian	High	 North.	 Al-
though	Oslo	has	not	withdrawn	from	overseas	operations,	it	has	






norway has been calling for the strengthening of nato’s col-
lective defence.	It	would	like	to	see	a	better	balance	between	the	
development	of	NATO’s	capabilities	for	collective	defence	on	the	
one	 hand,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 NATO’s	 capabilities	 for	 cri-
sis	management	 operations	 on	 the	 other.	According	 to	Norway,	
it	 is	necessary	to	rebalance	NATO’s	activities	due	to	the	current	
overemphasis	of	NATO	member	 states	and	NATO	structures	on	
developing	 capabilities	 for	 overseas	 operations.	 Over	 the	 past	
ten	years,	NATO	member	states	have	been	very	actively	involved	

























measures	 refocusing	 on	NATO’s	 collective	 defence	 should	 cover	
three	areas:	surveillance, intelligence and deterrence.	Deter-
rence	 refers	 here	 to	 the	 maintenance	 of	 updated	 and	 credible	
contingency	 plans,	 supported	 with	 adequate	 presence	 of	 both	
Norwegian	 (military	 bases,	 exercises)	 and	 allied	 armed	 forces	
















posed	using	 a	pilot	project	 to	 increase	 the	 cooperation	between	
the	 Norwegian	 Joint	 Headquarters	 and	 NATO	 command	 struc-





gency	planning	 and	 the	 return	 of	 responsibilities	 for	 regional	 defence	 to	
the	 Joint	Force	Commands	 (Brunssum	and	Naples);	 improvements	 to	geo-
graphical	expertise	and	situational	awareness	along	NATO	borders;	the	de-
velopment	of	closer	links	between	national	and	NATO	command	structures;	
and	 increased	NATO	 involvement	 in	 national	 and	multinational	military	
exercises.	 Espen	 Barth	 Eide,	 ‘Collective	 defence	 in	 today's	 security	 envi-





















Norway	 (including	 the	 regularly	 held	Air	 Force	 exercise	NATO	








it should be noted that	 oslo’s calls for greater emphasis on 
nato’s collective defence do not mean that norway plans to re-
frain from taking part in nato’s crisis-management missions 
or from the operations of the coalitions of the willing on the 
side of the united states or the european allies	 (see	Appendix	
2).	Norway	continues	to	see	its	involvement	in	overseas	missions	as	
a	way	to	consolidate	its	position	within	NATO	and	in	its	relations	
with	 the	 allies.	 nonetheless, its involvement in such opera-






In	 2012,	 the	 drills	were	 attended	 by	 fifteen	 countries	 and	 approximately	
16,000	soldiers.	Cold	Response	is	to	be	held	every	two	years.	Forsvaret,	Cold	






quarters	 in	 Bodø,	 Nordland,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 Troms	 region,	



























of strengthening its bilateral relations with the united states.	
The	US	is	seen	as	the	country’s	most	important	NATO	ally	and	a	de 
facto guarantor of	Norway’s	national	security.	Consequently,	Oslo	
has	 been	 seeking	 to	 strengthen	Norwegian-American	 relations	
and	to	bolster	US	presence	in	Norway.	In	the	military	sphere,	the	
Norwegian	government	has	managed	to	maintain	a	constant	US	
presence	 by	 storing	 US	 military	 equipment	 under	 the	 Marine	





for	 assurances	 about	 the	 continued	 development	 of	 close	 links	
between	the	two	countries’	arms	industries37.	Oslo	is	also	keen	to	





























however, oslo’s goal of increasing the nato presence in the 
norwegian high north and of securing close relations with 





















38	 The	Cold	Response	exercises	have	so	 far	 followed	crisis	management	sce-































development	 of	 the	Norwegian	Armed	 Forces.	 Despite	 the	 good	
reputation	enjoyed	by	the	military,	both	domestically	and	inter-
nationally,	 some	 areas	 of	 the	 modernisation	 and	 restructuring	
are	facing	difficulty.











biggest	 defence	 budget	 among	 the	 Nordic	 countries:	 in	 recent	
years	 it	 overtook	Sweden	 in	 this	 respect,	 despite	Sweden’s	 sub-
stantially	 larger	population	and	a	higher	GDP	 (see	Appendix	3).	
norway is also one of few nato countries to retain compul-
sory military service, and is the only nato country to extend 




























the primary task of the norwegian armed forces	 is	 to	 act,	
both	 independently	and	 together	with	 its	 allies,	 to	protect	Nor-









Norwegian	 jurisdiction	 (see	 Appendix	 5).	 They	 are	 responsible	
for	 customs,	 policing,	 environmental	 control	 and	 the	 monitor-
ing	of	fishing	activity	in	maritime	areas,	as	well	as	for	maritime	
and	 land	 search	 and	 rescue.	Other	 tasks	 include	 the	protection	
of	the	land	border	between	Norway	and	Russia,	the	protection	of	























the modernisation and restructuring of the norwegian 
armed forces has	 reflected	 these	priorities	 and	 tasks.	This	 re-
fers	particularly	to	the	Norwegian	High	North43,	where	Norway	





wegian	navy and the coast guard	(a	branch	of	the	Navy),	both	
of	which	have	received	new	vessels	 in	recent	years44.	Currently,	

















44	 The	Navy	 has	 received	 five	 Fridtjof	Nansen-class	 frigates	 and	 six	 Skjold-
class	patrol	boats,	referred	to	also	as	coastal	corvettes.	Both	types	of	vessels	
are	to	be	armed	with	Kongsberg’s	Naval	Strike	Missiles	(NSM).	The	Coast	
Guard	 has	 14	 vessels,	 including	 the	Nornen-class	 (5	 new	 units)	 and	 Bar-
entshav-class	(3	units)	patrol	vessels.	By	2016,	the	Coast	Guard	is	to	receive	




















special	 cases)	 IT	 infrastructure	 and	of	 command	&	 control	 and	
communications	systems	against	potential	cyber-attacks.
The	 significance	 of	 the	Norwegian	High	North	 is	 also	 reflected	
in	the	geographical location in this region of military infra-
structure across norway,	 although	 this	 has	 also	 partly	 been	







of	 Bodø	 (Nordland	 region).	 In	 line	with	 the	 Long-Term	Defence	







der	 to	maintain	 a	 fast	 response	 time	 in	 the	 High	 North.	 Bases	
in	northern	Norway	also	house	the	country’s	only	fleet	of	patrol	




mandoen)	 in	 Troms	 region;	 the	 Naval	 Special	 Operations	 Unit	























telligence	 gathering	&	 electronic	warfare	 battalion;	 the	 combat	
engineer	battalion,	the	armoured	battalion;	the	signal	battalion;	
the	 logistics	 battalion,	 and	 the	medical	 battalion	 (in	 Troms	 re-
gion).	Furthermore,	the	town	of	Kirkenes	on	the	Norwegian-Rus-
sian	border	(Finnmark	region)	houses	the	border	guard	battalion.
Although	 Norwegian	 management	 of	 the	 financing,	 recruit-
ment,	operation,	restructuring	and	modernisation	of	the	Armed	





the	 current	 conscription	model	 for	 the	operational	 readiness	of	
the	 Norwegian	 Armed	 Forces47.	 The	 country’s	 military	 consist	










Research	 Institute	 (FFI),	Nils	Holme.	See	Nils	Holme,	 ‘Forsvarspolitikken	
ved	et	veiskille’,	Civita-Rapport,	April	2013,	http://www.civita.no/publikas-
jon/forsvarspolitikken-ved-et-veiskille
































lowering	 the	 operational	 capabilities	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 Armed	
Forces	as	a	whole.




across	Northern	Europe,	 both	with	 other	NATO	member	 states	
as	 well	 as	 with	 Sweden	 and	 Finland.	 Norway	 has	 been	 one	 of	
the	main	 advocates	 of	 intensifying	Nordic	 defence	 cooperation;	
it	has	developed	a	 strategy	of	 cooperation	between	other	North	
Sea	countries,	and	has	supported	the	idea	of		political	and	military	
cooperation	 within	 the	 Northern	 Group.	 Through	 these	 initia-
tives,	Oslo	hopes	 to	boost	defence	capabilities	both	at	home	and	
across	the	region,	 in	response	to	the	changing	security	context.	


















military	 capabilities	 against	 the	background	of	 increasing	 stra-
tegic	importance	of	the	High	North,	on	the	one	hand;	and	to	the	
uncertainty	about	the	future	development	and	political	cohesion	
of	NATO,	 and	 about	 the	 degree	 of	Washington’s	 involvement	 in	
Europe	on	the	other.	in norway’s view, political and military 
cooperation between the nordic countries and with major 
european allies has a deterrent effect against russia. its aim 
is to raise interoperability, to build closer military ties, and 
to increase the presence of norway’s partners and allies in 
the country.
norway’s involvement in the nordic defence cooperation 
(nordefco) initiative49,	 alongside	 Sweden,	 Finland	 and	 Den-
mark,	 aims	 to	 strengthen	 the	defence	 capabilities	 of	 the	 region	
through	joint	military	exercises	and	training,	as	well	as	the	joint	
procurement	of	armament	and	military	equipment.	Working	to-





































norway’s military cooperation with the north sea countries	
is	seen	in	exactly	these	terms.	The	very	presence	of	these	countries	
in	the	Norwegian	High	North,	as	well	as	military-technical,	and	










agreement	have	 included	Royal	Marines	 commando	 training	 in	
the	Norwegian	High	North52.	Meanwhile,	 in	April	2013,	Norway	
signed	 an	 agreement	 on	military	 cooperation	with	 the	Nether-
lands;	 this	 document	 envisages	 joint	 training	 programmes	 and	
cooperation	between	individual	branches	of	the	countries’	armed	










































the	possibility	of	political and military cooperation and dia-
logue across northern europe within the framework of the 
northern group,	which	includes	the	Nordic	and	Baltic	countries,	
the	UK,	 the	Netherlands,	 Germany	 and	 Poland56.	 The	Northern	
Group	 format	 merges	 all	 existing	 formats	 of	 military	 coopera-
tion	led	by	Norway:	the	Nordic	format,	the	Nordic-Baltic	format,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 North	 Sea	 Strategy,	 with	 Poland’s	 participation.	
It	also	gives	Sweden	and	Finland	the	opportunity	 to	participate	
in	talks	held	by	NATO	member	states	about	regional	challenges	


























iii. norway and the Baltic sea region
for a number of reasons, norway would seem to be a natu-
ral partner for poland and other countries in the Baltic sea 
region seeking closer cooperation on the bilateral, regional, 
and nato levels. Although	Norway	does	not	see	itself	as	a	mem-
ber	of	the	Baltic	Sea	region,	as	a	result	of	its	intense	political	and	
military	 cooperation	 with	 Sweden	 and	 Finland,	 Oslo	 does	 pay	
close	attention	to	changes	in	regional	security	environment.	Just	









despite sharing similar interests, norway has been rather 
cautious in its approach to cooperation with allies from the 
Baltic sea region with regard to nato’s collective defence.	
This	has	been	the	case	for	two	reasons.	First,	Norway	sees	Poland	
and	the	Baltic	states	as	competitors	in	its	efforts	to	attract	the	al-







rimental	 effect	 on	 Norwegian-Russian	 relations.	 Consequently,	
57	 Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Et	 forsvar	 for	 vår	 tid.	 Proposisjon	 til	
















Norway’s	 military	 or	 political	 involvement	 in	 NATO	 activities	
in	 these	 regions	–	which	Russia	 sees	as	hostile	 –	 could	have	 re-
percussions	 for	 the	 High	 North.	 Oslo’s	 concerns	might	 explain	






during	 the	 Russian-Georgian	war	 in	 2008.	Norway	 blamed	 the	
outbreak	of	the	hostilities	on	Georgia,	although	it	also	argued	that	
Russia	acted	in	violation	of	international	law.	During	the	conflict,	









despite norway’s distanced position, the countries in Baltic 
sea region can still find areas for cooperation based on similar 
interests within nato – although the principle of reciprocity 
ought to be a key element when dealing with oslo.	Norway’s	
calls	 for	 the	 refocusing	on	NATO’s	 collective	defence	deserve	 to	
be	supported.	The	implementation	of	specific	projects	should	take	
place	not	only	in	the	High	North,	but	also	on	NATO’s	eastern	pe-
riphery.	 In	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 interoperability	 of	 the	 armed	
forces	across	Northern	Europe,	it	is	of	interest	to	other	countries	
to	 take	 part	 in	 Norway's	 national	 military	 exercises	 (e.g.	 Cold	



























in recent years, the bilateral dimension of relations between 
norway and poland has created greater opportunities for co-
operation. the most promising of these have been the prag-
matic military-technical collaboration, which may benefit 
the armed forces and the defence industries of both countries, 
but which has not a distinctive political character and will 





by	 a	 rise	 in	military	 spending.	 In	 addition,	Poland	has	 recently	





59	 Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Et	 forsvar	 for	 vår	 tid.	 Proposisjon	 til	
Stortinget”,	 Prop.	 73	 S,	 p	 28,	 23	March	 2012,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf.	 This	 was	 fur-
ther	 emphasised	 during	 an	 unprecedented	 visit	 to	 Poland	 made	 in	 2012	
by	Norway’s	royal	couple,	the	Defence	Minister	and	the	Foreign	Minister.	
The	 agenda	 contained	 an	 important	 point	 on	military-technical	 coopera-




















laboration	between	 the	special	 forces61.	Norway	 is	currently	re-
structuring	its	Special	Operations	Forces	(SOF)62,	while	Poland’s	
SOF	already	constitute	a	separate	branch	of	the	armed	forces	and	
are	 the	 country’s	 strongest	 asset	 in	NATO.	 In	 exchange,	 Poland	
could	 benefit	 from	 Norwegian	 SOF’s	 experience	 in	 protecting	
critical	infrastructure	(such	as	energy	infrastructure,	especially	











61	 Poland’s	Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Meeting	 of	 Polish	 and	 Norwegian	 Special	
Forces	 Commanders’,	 23	 February	 2013,	 http://www.mon.gov.pl/en/ar-
tykul/12484	














































appendix 2. norway’s participation in international 
operations63
operation / no. of troops 



























3 2 1 1
Sudan
-	UNMIS/UNISFA	(ONZ) 22 20 11 19
Congo








-	UNSTO	(ONZ) 13 14 12 13
Sinai	Peninsula	
-	MFO	(ONZ) 6 3 3 3
63	 Source:	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	‘Facts	and	Figures.	Norwegian	De-
fence’	from	the	years	2010-2013,	http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/docu-
ments/Handbooks-and-brochures.html?id=2126	 as	 well	 as	 Forsvaret,	 Ope-
















operation / no. of troops 
































appendix 3. Military expenditure
Military expenditure in Norway and Sweden between  































appendix 4. norwegian armed forces: personnel strength 
and categories 
Strength of the Norwegian Armed Forces (2012)64 – military 















































19­month compulsory military service with 12­month initial 
service, and 5 months allocated to the revision training or 





















appendix 5. norwegian armed forces: domestic activity
Norwegian Air Force – Air Policing Activity66
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
No.	of	flights 32 38 36 34 41




Norwegian Coast Guard – Number of Patrol Days  
in Northern and Southern Norway67
2010 2011 2012
Northern	Norway 2112 2226 2137
Southern	Norway 1375 1373 1469
66	 Quick	 Reaction	 Alert	 of	 the	multi-role	 F-16	 aircraft.	 ‘Forsvaret,	 Kampfly:	
klare	 på	 15	minutter’,	 http://forsvaret.no/operasjoner/norge/Sider/Kamp-
fly.aspx
67	 Forsvaret,	Forsvarets	årsrapport	2012,	22	March	2013,	http://forsvaret.no/
om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/
Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf
